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I.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON REPLY

A. Did the District Court make its sentencing decision prior to the sentencing
hearing?
B. Did Mr. White properly object to the contents of the PSI report and
obtaining a ruling from the District Court require resentencing?
C. Did the District Court violate Mr. White's due process rights when the court
allowed unsworn testimony of the state's witness at sentencing?

D. Did the District Court impose a sentence which was not proportionate to the
crime committed in violation of Idaho State Constitution Article I, §6?

11.

ARGUMENT ON REPLY

A. Mr. White has properly shown that the District Court made its sentencing
decision prior to the sentencing hearing.

The sentencing court's statement that it had formed a "strong idea" as to a sentence prior
to coming into court indicates it had made an immutable decision, one which would prevail at
sentencing over the arguments advanced by Mr. White and his counsel. The word "strong" means
the idea "is able to withstand great force or pressure", "is likely to succeed because of sound
reasoning", and "is finnly held or established". 1
The court made no indication that Mr. White's statement, or arguments of counsel, made
any impact on the sentence decided prior to coming to the hearing. (RP-59-60) The district court

"Strong." Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster,
webster.com/dictionary/strong. Accessed 15 Aug. 2021 .

https://www.merriam-

showed no attempt to individualize Mr. White's sentence to his unique circumstances. (RP 59-60)
Factually, Mr. White was heavily intoxicated at the time of the event giving rise to this case and
became engaged in a sudden quaITel with the man who was killed. At sentencing, Mr. White
expressed deep remorse for his actions and indicated he works daily on his faith and sobriety. Mr.
White proposed that if he was granted the opportunity to have a life outside of prison, he would
use his freedom to volunteer with animals and other recovering alcoholics and he requested the
court give him the chance to be a productive member of society. (RP 49-50) The court stated it
believed Mr. White was in fact provoked and justifiably outraged by being chased and struck
several times by the decedent. (RP 59-60) Despite this, the court stated it had heard nothing that
changed its views on sentencing, and sentenced Mr. White to 25 years fixed to life in prison which
presumably was the court's intention to do so prior to hearing any evidence at all at the sentencing
hearing. There was no discussion by the court of Mr. White's remorse or his sobriety. (RP 5359)
ICR 33 reqmres the sentencing judge to ask the defendant if he wishes to make a
statement-the allocution- prior to sentencing. State v. Gervasi, 69 P. 3d 1074, 1078 (2003).
Here, the court indicated it had made a detennination on sentencing prior to the hearing, which in
practical te1ms meant that Mr. White's allocution (his request for mercy from the Court) as the
judge showed no indication his plea for mercy, or the evidence and objections of his counsel, had
any weight on its sentence. (RP 60)
At its core, the district court's imposition of Mr. White's sentence without regard to his
allocution is akin to a situation where a court fails to offer the defendant an opportunity to give an

2

allocution.

The fonnalities of a sentencing hearing (including but not limited to the allocution,

arguments of counsel, etc.) and the requirements upon the court and counsel are more than just
weightless safeguards of a defendant's constitutional rights; these are present, so a defendant has
one last chance to personally speak to the court, plead for mercy and attempt to mitigate
punishment.

I.C.R. 33(a)(l); Stale v. Carey, 122 Idaho 382, 386, 834 P.2d 899, 903

(Ct.App.1992). Courts have regarded the allocution as helping to "avoid the appearance of
dispensing assembly-line justice." U11itcu tnle!> v. Bustamante- .onchas, 850 F.3d 1130 (10th
Cir. 2017). Cases decided after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Green v. Uni led Stales, 365
U.S. 301,304, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961) have established that the critical purpose of the
allocution is multi-faceted: to allow the defendant the chance to present mitigating circumstances,
including present personal characteristics to enable the sentencing court to craft an individualized
sentence, and to present the appearance of fairness in the criminal justice system." United Stutes
v. Ward, 732 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2013)( citing Thomas, Beyond Mitigation, 75 Fordham L.Rev. at
2643). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted that in situations where a judge
imposed a sentence prior to a defendant's allocution, the sentence was to be set aside, the hearing
reopened, and the "trial court must genuinely reconsider the sentence in light of the
[allocution)." United States . Barnes, 948 F.2d 325,331 n. 5 (7th Cir.1991)(citations omitted).
The Respondent argues this first issue on appeal is merely Mr. White asserting the district
court fanned a tentative decision on sentencing prior to engaging in the sentencing hearing.
However, throughout Mr. White's Opening Brief, the Toohill factors are discussed in conjunction
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with his argument that the district court failed to properly apply them. See, Appellant's Opening
Brief, Page 14.
All of Mr. White's issues on appeal are cogently tied together with the district court's
pronouncements at sentencing. A "pretty strong idea" as to Mr. White's sentence does not leave
much room for the court to fonn new, alternative and/or individualized reasoning for a sentence.
This inhibits Mr. White's constitutional rights to present evidence in mitigation, plead to an openminded and actively listening sentencing court, and connect the Toohill factors to his sentence,
and reduces the sentencing hearing to a mere fonnality.
The spirit of the allocution implores a sentencing court to truly listen to a defendant's
statement and consider ways to individualize the defendant's sentence in conjunction with the
requirements of the law. A sentence that is made prior to the sentencing hearing and imposed after
engaging in a perfunctory hearing violated Mr. White's constitutional rights.
B. Mr. White properly objected to the contents of the PSI and did in fact obtain
an adverse ruling from the court which requires resentencing.

The State contends because Mr. White did not secure an adverse ruling on the issue of
defense counsel's objections to infonnation contained in the PSI report he is barred from
advancing the issue. However, after defense counsel's objections to information contained within
the report (and more fully set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief), the court noted the objection in
writing but did not make an oral ruling on the objection and did not "redline" the PSI. Respondents
admit in their briefing that "the inforn1ation contained in the PSI that White challenges was not
accurate." Brief of Respondent at 6.
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With both parties agreeing certain information in the PSI was not accurate, the district court
should disregard that information and excise that infonnation from the PSI. State v. Carey, 152
Idaho 720,721,274 P. 3d 21, 22 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950,961,231 P.3d
1047, 1058 (Ct. App. 2010). The Respondent also contends that Mr. White's counsel's failure to
request a ruling on his objections prohibits this court from reviewing the issue.

In a recent

unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals "decline[ d] to impose an obligation on a
defendant to make a formal motion under circumstances where ... the court directly invites a party
to identify needed additions or corrections." Stale of Idaho v. Toiy Jonathon Marshall, No. 46937,
September 3, 2020.

Here, the comi invited the State and Mr. White to make additions or

corrections and made written notes for the court file related to those changes. The district court
should have followed the guidance set forth in Molen and redlined the incorrect information in the
PSI. As such, this issue should be remanded to the district court to ensure any changes made to
the PSI are reflected on the PSI, since it is subject to disclosure under I.C.R. 32(h).

C. Mr. White's due process rights were violated when the unsworn testimony of
a state's witness was admitted into evidence at sentencing.
The Confrontation Clause provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right. .. to be confronted with witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Idaho Const.
Art. I Sec. 13. This clause applies to witnesses who bear testimony against the accused." Crawford

v. Washinglon, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). Testimony is defined as "[a] solemn declaration or
affitmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51
(alteration in original; citation omitted). "It is clear that a statement-forensic or otherwise-is
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testimonial if it is made primarily with an evidentiary purpose, regardless of its formality or any
other particular criteria." Stale v. Stanlicld, 158 Idaho 327, 347 P.3d 175 (Idaho 2015)(citing
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, _ , 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011); see also Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 32411 (2009)). The United States Supreme Court has held this
procedural guarantee of the accused to confront the witnesses against him applies to both federal
and state prosecutions. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,406 (1965). Because our state constitution
does not contain a confrontation clause similar to that found in the United States Constitution;
therefore, this issue is analyzed solely under the United States Constitution. State v. Sharp, 101
Idaho 498, 502, 616 P .2d 1034, 103 8 (1980).
A document created solely for an evidentiary purpose, made in aid of a police investigation,
was held to be testimonial in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174
L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the introduction of evidence to
establish or prove a fact, by non-testifying witnesses, as well as when "an expert acts merely as a
well-credentialed conduit" and does not provide any independent expert opinion, the defendant's
right to confrontation is violated. Stale v. taniield, 158 Idaho 327, 347 P.3d 175 (2015).
The admission of Mr. Kirkhart' s testimony and altered video was introduced by the State
presumably to further their argument for a lengthy prison tenn. The court never offered defense
counsel the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Kirkhart. The Respondent contends that defense
counsel made no specific request to cross-examine Mr. Kirkhart and because of that should not be
allowed to advance this issue on appeal. In support of its position, the Respondent outlines the
discussion between the court, the prosecutor and counsel for the defendant. Respondent's Brief at
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Pag 22. It can be clearly seen that the district court never gave defense counsel the option of crossexamination.
When the district court allowed the unsworn testimony of a state witness, along with the
admission of evidence which the witness altered to prejudicial effect, Mr. White's confrontation
right was violated.

D. The sentence imposed violated the defendant's rights under Article I, §6 of
the Idaho State Constitution, as it was not proportionate.

In exploring the dimensions of the protections afforded by the cruel and unusual
punishments clause of art. 1, § 6 of our state constitution, our appellate courts have said:
Cruel and unusual punishments were originally regarded as referring to such
barbarous impositions as pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
drawing and quartering, and the like. But it is now generally recognized that
imprisonment for such a length of time as to be out of all proportion to the gravity
of the offense committed, and such as to shock the conscience of reasonable
[people], is cruel and unusual within the meaning of the constitution.
State v. Evans. 73 Idaho 50, 57-58, 245 P.2d 78(', 792 (1952) (emphasis added). Mr. White's
crime did kill a man, however, that killing occurred during an incident where both men were
intoxicated, during a bar fight, and immediately preceding Mr. White being beaten by the decedent.
Mr. White's intoxication, combined with his sentence being that significantly beyond the sentence
imposed for other manslaughter sentences, indicates his sentence is disproportionate to the nature
of the offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense and the actual sentence imposed.
Here the District Court notes, Mr. White is not otherwise a person who one would expect
to commit murder and should not be sentenced to long prison time. (RP 58) Mr. White is not a
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person we could consider a career criminal or known as a particularly violent person. (RP 59) The
court believes he was provoked and justifiably outraged by Mr. Clark chasing him, hitting him,
and repeatedly hitting him, blow after blow. (RP 59-60) These facts are more akin to the facts
found in a voluntary manslaughter conviction as argued by Mr. Redal and would result in a 15year maximum sentence.

The defense argued the court should consider that in entering its

sentence.
The District Court did not consider the proportionality argument when a sentence of 25
years fixed tenn was imposed.

(RP 60)

The defendant seeks a remand for resentencing

considering the mitigating factors, including his lack of prior felony convictions. Slate v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89, 90,645 P. 2d 323,324 (1982)

C. CONCLUSION

The facts of the case are such that the case should be remanded back to the District
Court for resentencing. The Court made the sentencing decision without considering the
mitigating facts. Additionally, the Court failed to consider the proportionality with a crime such
as a voluntary manslaughter case. These matters call for a resentencing by the District Court.

Respectfully filed this 27 th day of September, 2021.

s/Douglas D. Phelps
Douglas D. Phelps, WSBA# 22620
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